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One of the principal  problems with the minimum wage is that  adjustments  to it must be 
voted  on by Congress.  Although  recent  congressional  action  solves the immediate  problem  of 
restoring  value to a wage that  has otherwise  failed to keep pace with inflation,  it has not removed 
the issue from the political  agenda. Every time Congress  acts, it does so amidst debate about the 
legitimacy  of the wage. When Congress  does act, it is usually too  little and too  late. Therefore,  it 
might be preferable  to create  an automatic  mechanism for adjusting the minimum wage that would 
not only assume the value of a wage floor to society, but be tied to levels of productivity.  Such an 
approach  would  accomplish  two objectives.  First, it would be in keeping  with the economic 
argument  that  an artificial wage floor  can lead to greater  productivity,  rather  than to the 
disemployment  effect assumed in traditional  economic  textbooks.  Second,  because increases to 
the wage would  be regular and expected,  unlike the shocks  attendant  to sporadic  increases.  In the 
end such a plan might not only lead to less political  opposition,  but to greater  efficiency. During  the  summer  of  1996,  Congress  once  again  passed,  as it has  done  many  times 
during  the  past  sixty  years,  a minimum  wage  increase.  Up  from  $4.35  an hour,  the  minimum 
wage  is currently  $5.15  an hour  after  being  implemented  in two  increments.  The  first  took  effect 
in the  fall  of  1996  and  the  second  just  took  effect  during  the  fall  of  1997.  This  latest  increase  no 
doubt  settles  the  issue  for  a while.  But  at the  same  time,  it fails  to remove  the  issue  from  the 
political  agenda,  because  each  time  it is discovered  that  the  wage  is no  longer  adequate,  the  issue 
must  once  again  be acted  on  by  Congress.  That  an increase  in the  wage  requires  an act  of 
Congress  means  that  the  legitimacy  of the  wage  can  be revisited,  and  the  same  arguments 
constantly  rehearsed.  Invariably,  by the  time  the  wage  is acted  on,  the  increase  is too  little  and 
too  late  to be of  any  real  benefit.  Still,  the  minimum  wage  is only  a fraction  of the  median  hourly 
wage  of  $12.25  for  1996,  and  it will  be  almost  $2.00  below  the  median  wage  in the  lowest  wage 
sector  of  the  economy  -  the  retail  sector  -  where  most  minimum  wage  workers  tend  to be. 
Even  assuming  an EITC  of $3,370  for a single  mother  with  two  children,  that  family  with  an 
effective  income  of  $14,082  will  still  be below  the  official  poverty  level. 
Some  municipalities,  like  Baltimore  for  instance,  have  passed  “living  wage”  laws 
mandating  that  companies  that  do business  with  them  pay  their  workers  a wage  of  around  $7.60 
an hour.  And  while  it is indeed  too  early  to tell  what  the  effects  of this  will  be,  these  laws  stem 
from  the  firm  conviction  that  there  are some  benefits  to be derived,  in addition  to the  moral 
consideration  of fairness,  from  paying  a wage  that  enables  people  to live  in dignity  and 
participate  more  fully  in the  market  place  as consumers.  Although  it is unlikely  that  Congress 
will  mandate  a minimum  wage  that  might  be considered  a living  wage,  there  are some  critical 
policy  questions  that  need  to be addressed,  nonetheless. 
1 Given  that  the  new  welfare  law -  passed  at the  same  time  as the  minimum  wage  increase 
-  mandates  that  states  create  welfare-to-work  programs  and  reduce  their  rolls  by  at least  50 
percent  by the  year  2002,  it is reasonable  to  ask  whether  the  national  wage  floor  also  should  not 
be  adjusted  so that  the  low-wage  and  low-skills  jobs  they  qualify  for  (Burtless,  1995),  will  enable 
them  to  live  at least  as well  as they  were  while  on public  assistance.  When  talking  about  the 
minimum  wage,  then,  there  are essentially  two  issues:  the  rate  at which  it is set  and  the  frequency 
at which  it is adjusted.  And  to  a large  extent,  the  fact  that  the  latter  has  never  seriously  been 
addressed,  the  former  has  only  become  more  volatile  politically.  The  critical  policy  question, 
then,  is whether  it would  not  be preferable  to create  an automatic  mechanism  for  adjusting  the 
minimum  wage,  which  not  only  would  assume  the  value  of a wage  floor  to society,  but  be tied  to 
levels  of productivity.  A wage  tied  to productivity  levels  would  be  in keeping  with  another  side 
of the  standard  text  book  theory  of the  wage,  which  unfortunately  has  received  little  attention. 
This  is the  idea  that  if an artificial  wage  floor  does  not  lead  to  lower  employment,  it must  then 
lead  to higher  productivity  (Stigler,  1946).  In this  brief,  I explore  some  reasons  for  why  the 
minimum  wage  ought  to be  increased  on  a regular  basis  and  offer  some  policy  proposals  for 
achieving  it. 
State  of Minimum  Wage  Debate 
The  minimum  wage,  since  its passage  in the  Fair  Labor  Standards  Act  (FLSA)  of  1938, 
has  always  been  a contentious  issue.  Despite  periodic  adjustments,  the  debate  over  the  Federal 
minimum  wage  specifically  and  the  concept  of a wage  floor  generally  has  continued  unabated. 
The  argument  often  given  for the  increase  is that  the  minimum  has  not  kept  pace  with  inflation 
2 and  as a result  those  working  at the  minimum  wage  find  themselves  below  the  poverty  level.  And 
indeed,  as Table  I shows  the  minimum  wage  for much  of its history  did  indeed  hover  around  50 
percent  of  average  annual  hourly  earnings,  but  during  the  1980s  and  much  of the  1990s  the  wage 
was  often  below  forty  percent, 
Table  I Comparison  Between  Minimum  and  Average  Annual 
Year  Minimum 
1938*  $ .25 
1939”  .30 
1945  .40 
1947  .40 
1950”  .75 
1956*  1  .oo 
1961*  1.15 
1963”  1.25 
1967”  1.40 
1968*  1.60 
1974*  2.00 
1975”  2.10 
1976*  2.30 
1978*  2.65 
1979*  2.90 
1980*  3.10 
1981*  3.35 
1990*  3.80 
1991*  4.25 
1995  4.25 
Annual  Average  Percentage 
NA  NA 
NA  NA 
NA  NA 
$1.13  35.4 
1.33  56.4 
1.80  55.6 
2.14  53.7 
2.28  54.8 
2.68  52.2 
2.85  56.1 
4.24  47.2 
4.53  46.4 
4.86  47.3 
5.69  46.6 
6.16  47.1 
6.66  46.5 
7.25  46.2 
10.01  38.0 
10.32  41.2 
11.46  37.1 
* These  are the  years  that  increases  in the  minimum  wage  took  effect. 
Source:  “History  of the  Federal  Minimum  Wage  Rates  Under  the  Fair  Labor  Standards 
Act  --  1938 Through  1991,”  U.S.  Department  of Labor,  Employment  Standards 
Administration;  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics,  Labstat  Series  Report,  Current  Employment 
Statistics,  Series  EEU00500006 
Therefore,  the  wage  should  be  increased  so that  the  working  poor  can  be given  some  relief,  as 
well  as those  on  public  assistance  might  be given  greater  incentive  to work.  Moreover,  it is a 
matter  of  simple  fairness  that  those  who  work  full  time  should  be able  to support  themselves  and 
3 their  families  above  the  poverty  line.  Opponents  of the  minimum  wage  often  counter  with  the 
argument  that  most  minimum  wage  workers  aren’t  poor  and  all an increase  in the  minimum  wage 
will  do  is result  in a disemployment  effect  among  the  teen  labor  market.  Firms  unable  to pay 
higher  labor  costs  will  either  have  to  cut  back  on  their  labor,  reduce  benefits  or substitute 
technology  -  capital  -  for  labor  in order  to  achieve  greater  productivity. 
Data  on  the  effects  of the  minimum  wage  has  been  ambiguous  at best.  The  principal  focus 
of much  of  the  empirical  research  has  been  on  the  youth  labor  market.  It has  become  the 
prevailing  wisdom  that  the  minimum  wage  does  indeed  take  its greatest  toll  on  the  youth  labor 
market,  that  a binding  wage  floor  does  reduce  employment  for younger  and  less-skilled  workers. 
(Kosters  & Welch,  1972;  Welch,  1974,  1978;  Meyer  & Wise,  1983).  Moreover  these  studies 
have  been  buttressed  by  a minimum  wage  study  commission  that  has  not  only  found  that  a  10 
percent  increase  in the  minimum  wage  leads  to a l-3  percent  reduction  in employment  among 
teenagers,  but  has  advocated  the  use  of  subminimum  wages  for teenagers  (Nordlund,  1997).  And 
while  others  have  concluded  these  findings  to be  sound,  they  have  also  conceded  that  the  effects 
are perhaps  proportionately  smaller  among  20-24  year  olds  (Neumark  & Wascher,  1992),  and 
that  adults  on balance  appear  to be better  off  under  a wage  floor.  And  yet,  despite  the  smaller 
effects  among  adults,  they  have  not  been  the  focus  of much  of the  research. 
Nevertheless,  these  studies  have  been  consistent  with  a model  of competitive  markets. 
This  model  holds  the  costs  to  society  of raising  wages  to be greater  than  any  benefits,  It is 
predicated  on  the  assumption  that  market  clearing  wages  can  be  achieved  when  the  demand  for 
labor  is exactly  equal  to the  supply  of labor.  In  such  a market  there  is no  such  thing  as 
unemployment  because  the  price  of  labor  will  drop  to the  point  that  all available  labor  can  be 
4 consumed,  and  this  is the  point  at which  the  economy  achieves  full  employment.  It is at this 
intersection  that  there  exists  an equilibrium  wage  that  enables  both  firms  and  workers  to 
maximize  profits  and  utility  respectively.  Should  the  supply  of  labor  increase,  there  will 
naturally  be  a reduction  in the  cost  of  labor  until  supply  once  again  equals  demand.  A wage  floor, 
however,  prevents  the  cost  of  labor  from  dropping,  thereby  forcing  the  firm  to reduce  its demand 
for  labor,  with  the  result  being  unemployment.  In a competitive  market,  each  worker  receives  the 
value  of his  or her  marginal  product.  A minimum  wage,  if it is effective  will  do  one  of two 
things:  it will  either  result  in the  layoff  of those  workers  whose  value  is less  than  the  minimum  or 
it will  result  in an increase  in productivity  among  low-efficiency  workers  (Stigler,  1946). 
Consequently,  the  minimum  wage  ends  up hurting  the  low  wage  workers  -  precisely 
those  whom  it was  intended  to help.  As the  cost  of labor  is increased  the  demand  for  labor 
decreases.  Only  if the  demand  for  goods  and  services  on the  part  of consumers  is increased  can  it 
be  expected  that  there  will  be  an increased  demand  for  labor  that  will  effectively  bid  up  wages.  A 
minimum  wage,  then,  benefits  some  -  those  who  will  be paid  more  money  -  at a cost  to  others 
-  those  who  will  either  lose  their  jobs  and/or  not  be able  to find  other  jobs  because  employers 
do not  believe  their  value  to be worth  the  new  minimum  wage.  A policy  which  artificially  raises 
wages  to help  some  at the  expense  of others  is simply  inefficient.  Even  if there  is some  outward 
appearance  of benefit  to  be derived  from  an increase  in the  wage  floor,  there  will  invariably  be a 
cost  to be borne  whether  in the  form  of job  loss,  lost  opportunity  for jobs,  lost  benefits  or 
increased  output  per  man  hour  -  the  demand  for higher  productivity. 
The  problem  with  this  model  is that  it represents  a theoretical  construct  with 
characteristics  that  simply  do  not  exist  in the  real  world.  Although  the  minimum  wage  is 
5 assumed  to be  inefficient  because  it leads  to  an underutilization  of  labor  in the  aggregate,  the 
competitive  model  fails  to address  the  consequences  of a world  where  wages  could  be allowed  to 
drop  to  a level  whereby  demand  would  be equal  to supply.  In the  real  world,  the  minimum  wage 
is likely  to  affect  different  people  differently.  Moreover,  the  model  of perfect  competition 
assumes  the  minimum  wage  to be besides  the  point  because  the  source  of  low  wages  is not  a 
function  of  distorted  market  power,  but  the  failings  of individuals.  That  is, they  simply  are  not 
worth  more  than  the  low  wages  they  have  been  receiving.  Therefore,  it is up  to them  to  improve 
themselves,  and  a minimum  wage  cannot  solve  this  problem;  rather  all that  it can  do  is artificially 
inflate  wages,  thereby  absolving  low-wage  workers  of their  responsibility  for  themselves.  As  the 
locus  of the  model  is on the  individual,  it totally  negates  structural  variables  that  may  affect 
individual  behavior.  And  yet,  the  focus  of much  of the  research  on  the  youth  labor  market 
through  this  particular  set of  lenses  has  only  served  to obscure  the  potential  benefits  that  might 
accrue  specifically  to the  working  poor  (Levitan  & Belous,  1979). 
In more  recent  studies  by  David  Card  and  Alan  Krueger,  it has  been  found  that  increases 
in the  minimum  wage  do  not  necessarily  have  a disemployment  effect,  but  may  actually  lead  to 
higher  levels  of  employment.  Moreover,  the  minimum  wage  has  perhaps  been  kept  artificially 
low  because  of  labor  monopsony  -  that  there  is principally  one  single  industry  that  serves  as the 
principal  employer  of those  able  to command  the  minimum  wage,  or those  so deemed  “worth”  it 
(Card  and  Krueger,  1995).  Specifically,  in studies  of the  fast  food  industry  in California  and  New 
Jersey,  Card  and  Krueger  found  there  to be  little  disemployment  effect.  The  California  study 
involved  an increase  in California’s  minimum  wage  from  $3.35-  then  the  prevailing  federal 
minimum  -to  $4.25  during  July  of  1988.  The  unemployment  rate  in California  fell  from  5.8 to 
6 5.1 percent  from  1987-1989.  During  the  same  period,  the  national  rate  fell  from  6.2  to  5.3 
percent.  Although  this  would  suggest  that  economic  growth  in California  was  similar  to,  or 
maybe  slightly  slower  than,  the  rest  of the  nation,  the  pattern  was  quite  different  for  California 
teenagers.  For  teenagers  the  unemployment  rate  fell  3 percent  from  16.9 to  13.9 percent.  But  the 
average  U.S.  rate  only  fell  by  1.9 percent  from  16.9 to  15 percent.  The  rise  in minimum  wages 
raised  the  wages  of  low-wage  workers,  with  no  adverse  effects  on  employment. 
In the  New  Jersey  study,  where  the  state  raised  its wage  from  $4.25  to $5.05,  the  focus 
was  on  the  fast  food  industry  in New  Jersey  with  Pennsylvania  serving  as the  control  group.  The 
average  starting  wage  at fast  food  restaurants  in New  Jersey  increased  by  10 percent  following 
the  minimum  wage  increase.  But  the  minimum  wage  increase  had  no  apparent  “spillover”  on 
high-wage  restaurants.  Within  New  Jersey,  employment  expanded  at low  wage  stores  -  those 
paying  $4.25  per  hour  -  and  contracted  at high-wage  stores  -  those  paying  $5.00  or more  per 
hour.  Employment  also  contracted  between  February  and  November  1992  at fast-food  stores  that 
were  unaffected  by the  rise  in the  minimum  wage  -  those  stores  in Pennsylvania  and  New 
Jersey  paying  $5.00  or more  per  hour.  Moreover,  there  did  not  appear  to be  any  substitution 
effect.  Although  the  minimum-wage  increase  did  lead  to price  increases  for  meals,  suggesting 
that  the  costs  of  the  increase  were  simply  passed  onto  the  consumer,  there  was  no  evidence  that 
prices  rose  faster  among  stores  in New  Jersey  that  were  most  affected  by the  rise  in the  minimum 
wage.  Moreover,  the  raise  in minimum  wage  didn’t  negatively  affect  the  number  of  store 
openings,  and  it had  no  disemployment  effect  (Card  & Krueger,  1995). 
These  studies,  however,  have  been  controversial,  and  as such  have  raised  a whole  host  of 
other  research  questions.  The  locus  of these  questions  have  been  over  the  issue  of measurement 
7 and  the  quality  of  available  data.  John  Kennan,  for  instance,  has  suggested  that  it is simply  not 
known  that  there  would  not  be adverse  consequences  were  the  minimum  wage  to be  increased 
beyond  a certain  threshold.  Moreover,  it is unlikely  that  we  will  find  out  even  if we  were  to 
employ  a more  sophisticated  methodology  on the  existing  body  of data.  Rather  what  is needed  is 
more  sophisticated  data  (Kennan,  1995).  That  is, one  argument  for why  these  increases  may  not 
have  had  the  consequences  predicted  by the  competitive  model  is because  the  minimum  wage  is 
so far below  a market  clearing  wage  (Freeman  & Freeman,  1991;  R. Gordon,  1995).  Another 
issue  -  also  a twist  on  the  notion  that  the  wage  has  essentially  been  too  low  -  is whether  the 
minimum  wage  as such  represents  an adequate  measure  of well-being.  So  even  if there  is no  real 
disemployment  effect,  it is largely  besides  the  point  if the  wage  still  will  not  serve  to  lift people 
out  of poverty  (Burkhauser,  Couch  & Wittenburg,  1996).  And  yet,  these  types  of criticism  only 
support  the  contention  that  there  are other  policy  considerations  to take  into  account  other  than 
the  possibility  of a disemployment  effect. 
An  important  subtext,  often  neglected,  to the  whole  minimum  wage  debate  is that  there 
isn’t  any  conclusive  data  to make  any  definitive  statements  about  any  effects  at all, whether  they 
be positive  or negative.  Evidence  suggests  that  we  may  know  very  little  about  the  minimum 
wage  or its actual  effects.  Charles  Brown  has  suggested  that  the  minimum  wage  is essentially 
overrated  by  both  critics  and  supporters  alike.  Since  its passage  in  1938,  it has  averaged  a bit  less 
than  half  of hourly  earnings.  Those  who  earn  the  minimum  wage  account  for  6-12  percent  of 
those  employed  and  less  than  five  percent  of wage  and  salary  income.  The  reduction  in 
employment  in the  standard  model  isn’t  necessarily  accomplished  by  any  number  of workers 
being  discharged  because  the  turnover  rates  in minimum  wage  jobs  are on  the  order  of  12- 15 
8 percent  per  month  (Brown,  1988).  Nevertheless,  there  are complications  to  empirical  estimates 
of the  effects  of the  minimum  which  stem  largely  from  the  fact  that  the  Fair  Labor  Standards  Act 
has  exempted  some  employers.  Those  exempted  were  generally  smaller  ones,  with  the  standard 
of “smallness”  gradually  being  tightened  over  time.  Indeed,  the  original  legislation  exempted 
more  than  it included,  and  this  was  done  largely  to obtain  the  support  of  Southern  politicians  who 
were  generally  opposed  because  their  wages  were  considerably  lower  than  in the  north 
(Nordlund,  1997). 
As  of  1988,  the  uncovered  sector  consisted  mostly  of retail  trade  and  service  employees. 
Therefore,  the  basic  message  for  empirical  work  is that  one  must  account  for the  extent  of 
coverage  and  elasticity  of total  unskilled  employment  with  respect  to the  minimum  that  will  be 
smaller  than  elasticity  of demand.  The  second  complication  is that  minimum  wage  workers  bear 
no  unique  identifying  marks  besides  wage  rates,  and  the  effects  of the  minimum  wage  on 
employment  are  smaller  than  one  would  have  supposed.  Therefore,  when  viewed  in overall 
context,  Brown  finds  it hard  to  see  any  evidence  that  minimum  wage  increases  have  benefits 
which  would  overcome  an economist’s  instinctive  aversion  to  interfering  with  reasonably 
competitive  markets  (Brown,  1988).  Or stated  differently,  the  minimum  wage  only  benefits  a 
small  proportion  of the  labor  market  that  its potential  benefits  would  not justify  incurring  the 
possible  deleterious  effects. 
At the  same  time,  as David  Gordon  has  argued,  this  is only  true  if the  wage  is viewed 
solely  in terms  of only  those  who  earn  the  wage.  Most  conventional  estimates  only  look  at those 
earning  the  minimum  wage  at a single  point  in time.  A decline  in the  real  value  of the  minimum 
wage,  however,  also  affects  those  earning  in between  the  point  where  the  wage  used  to be  and 
9 where  it is at the  end  of the  dip.  This  is in addition  to those  “minimum  wage”  workers  who  earn 
at or below  the  wage.  When  viewed  in these  terms,  a decline  in the  real  minimum  wage  may  be 
seen  as a contributing  factor  to the  wage  squeeze  and  the  growing  income  inequality  (Gordon, 
1996,  pp.  2 14-2 15). Turned  around,  then,  an increase  in the  minimum  wage,  along  with  other 
labor  market  policies,  could  have  a beneficial  effect  on the  economy  insofar  as it would  begin  to 
reverse  the  decline  of wages  and  the  growth  in income  inequality.  And  consequently,  there  may 
be greater  productivity. 
Arguments  for Increasing  the  Minimum  Wage 
That  there  is such  ambiguity  in the  data  is good  reason  in and  of  itself  to look  to the  other 
potential  benefits  of  a minimum  wage.  From  the  stand  point  of  economic  theory,  there  are 
essentially  three  arguments  to be made  in favor  of the  minimum  wage.  Two  are microeconomic 
and  the  other  is macroeconomic.  The  first  microeconomic  argument  is a monopsony  one  because 
it assumes  there  to be  something  called  market  power,  and  because  of that  power  firms  are  in a 
position  to pay  lower  wages.  An  increase  in the  wage  would  then  serve  to  empower  low-skilled 
workers,  and  this  in turn  may  result  in some  supply-side  effects.  This  model,  which  has  by  and 
large  been  ignored  until  the  work  of Card  and  Krueger  brought  it back,  suggests  that  there  are 
potential  benefits  from  increases  in the  minimum  wage  that  may  counter  most  of the  negative 
consequences.  Among  the  potential  benefits  is that  individual  behavior  will  be affected  because 
higher  wages  will  offer  greater  incentives  to work.  The  higher  the  minimum  wage,  the  more 
likely  it is to  attract  individuals  into  the  labor  market.  Such  an approach  then  becomes  a 
powerful  one  for  assisting  the  poor.  According  to this  model,  the  minimum  wage  might  be 
10 viewed  as a positive  vehicle  for  lifting  those  at the  low  end  of  the  wage  scale  out  of poverty.  It 
suggests  that  an increase  in the  minimum  would  make  low-wage/low  skill jobs  attractive  to those 
who  are currently  on welfare  (Ellwood,  1988;  Bane  and  Ellwood,  1994).  Not  only  would  the 
higher  wage  enable  them  to  live  better,  butthey  may  feel  a greater  sense  of dignity  from  the  work 
itself,  regardless  of how  menial  it might  otherwise  seem. 
The  other  microeconomic  argument  is an efficiency-wage  argument  that  suggests  that 
higher  wages  lead  to greater  efficiency  because  workers  become  more  productive.  Individuals 
essentially  respond  to changes  in expected  net  income  on  wealth  or they  respond  to net  prices  of 
working  and  saving  which  may  be  affected  by transfer  programs.  Although  it is believed  that 
current  transfer  programs  do have  an impact  on  overall  labor  supply,  it is difficult  to conclude 
precisely  just  what  that  impact  may  be  (Danziger,  Haveman  and  Plotnick,  198 l).Therefore, 
raising  the  minimum  wage  might  have  the  effect  of offering  positive  inducement  to work, 
Moreover,  they  will  work  harder  and  thus  be more  productive.  And  employers  concerned  about 
shirking  will  pay  less  in monitoring  costs  because  the  higher  wage  is likely  to result  in less 
shirking  (Shapiro  and  Stiglitz,  1984). 
Often  referred  to as the  “Webb”  effect  after  Sidney  Webb,  it argues  that  a wage  floor  can 
lead  to greater  efficiency  because  workers  become  more  productive.  Although  an increase  in the 
minimum  wage  may  well  result  in a wage  exceeding  the  marginal  product  of the  worker,  the 
employer  now  has  incentive  to  find  ways  to  increase  productivity  either  by  getting  his  workers  to 
produce  more  or by  substituting  technology  for  labor.  The  worker  too  has  incentive  to  improve 
his  or her  skills  so the  value  of his/her  labor  will justify  the  new  wage.  (Webb,  1912).  Subsumed 
under  this  model  is the  notion  that  a minimum  wage  would  also  make  workers  more  productive 
11 because  it would  better  enable  them  to maintain  themselves  physically,  which  in turn  would 
sustain  them  spiritually.  Although  this  model  does  not  receive  much  attention  today,  it was  very 
influential  during  the  early  part  of the  twentieth  century,  and  it figured  prominently  in an array  of 
state  reform  efforts  that  ultimately  culminated  in the  Fair  Labor  Standards  Act  of  1938.  And  yet, 
despite  its lack  of  attention  it nonetheless  assumes  the  supply  and  demand  function  contained  in 
the  competitive  model,  but  essentially  turns  the  assumptions  flowing  from  it on their  head.  That 
is, those  who  are forced  to pay  higher  wages  would  simply  be  forced  to  find  ways  to  improve 
their  productivity  (R.  Gordon,  1995).  More  importantly,  it calls  attention  to the  fact  that  society 
through  a wage  policy  is essentially  expressing  a value  preference. 
On  one  level  it would  represent  a preference  for minimum  wages  above  some  poverty 
threshold.  But  on  another,  it might  represent  a preference  for  a higher  wage  economy  on  the 
assumption  that  a higher  wage  floor  might  offer  managers  incentive  to provide  the  type  of on- 
the-job  training  that  would  make  their  workers  more  productive.  Piore  and  Sabel  have  couched 
this  choice  as the  difference  between  the  low  and  high  roads.  The  low-road  essentially  assumes  a 
mass  production  industrial  economy  in which  most  functions  can  be performed  by  cheap  and 
low-skilled  workers.  If labor  is not  cheap  at home,  work  can  easily  be  outsourced  to those 
locations  where  labor  costs  are substantially  lower.  The  high-road,  by contrast,  would  entail 
developing  an innovative  information-based  economy  with  a flexible  and  high  skilled  labor  force 
able  to  command  higher  wages.  The  skills,  and  ultimately  productivity  of the  labor  force  would 
be developed  through  education  and  training  programs  (Piore  and  Sabel,  1984).  Although  a 
higher  wage  alone  could  not  stand  as the  sole  path  towards  a  high  wage  economy,  it might 
provide  a necessary  stick  for  employers  to invest  in the  necessary  education  and  training  for  their 
12 workers  to make  them  “worth”  the  new  wages.  Such  arguments  were  quite  persuasive  during  the 
early  part  of the  century  when  many  in industrial  mass  production  were  earning  anything  but  a 
“living  wage.”  The  problem  is that  productivity  is difficult  to measure  and  with  the  advent  of 
greater  empiricism  to the  evaluation  of the  minimum  wage  during  the  1970s  and  198Os, it has 
become  easier  to  focus  on  a particular  segment  of the  labor  market. 
But  as difficult  as productivity  is to measure,  there  are nonetheless  reasons  to believe  that 
the  productivity  arguments  are correct.  The  best  indicator  is the  impact  higher  wages  have  had  on 
unionized  firms.  Freeman  and  Medoff  have  argued  that  although  many  unionized  firms  may  have 
lower  levels  of profitability,  they  nonetheless  have  greater  efficiency  because  the  wage  gains 
achieved  through  collective  bargaining  has  resulted  in greater  productivity.  Therefore,  despite  the 
reduced  profitability  for  some,  there  are still  some  social  efficiency  gains  to be derived  from 
wage  and  other  securities  arising  from  collective  bargaining  agreements  (Freeman  & Medoff, 
1984).  But  higher  wages  would  also  lead  to greater  efficiency  because  it might  lead  to  lower 
levels  of turnover.  Because  job-turnover  is so high,  employers  have  generally  been  reluctant  to 
offer  on-the-job  training  -  the  type  of  investment  that  might  automatically  lead  to higher  levels 
of productivity  (Freeman,  1994:  Lynch,  1994). 
Lastly,  the  macroeconomic  argument  suggests  that  insofar  as a higher  wage  will  offer 
low-wage  workers  more  purchasing  power,  they  in turn  will  be  able  to demand  more  goods  and 
services.  As  they  do this,  businesses  will  produce  more,  and  they  in turn  will  hire  more  workers, 
which  may  have  the  inevitable  result  of naturally  bidding  up  wages  across  the  board.  Therefore, 
an increase  in the  minimum  wage,  though  it may  lead  to  some  short-term  adverse  consequences, 
will  lead  to  long-term  benefits  to the  economy  as a whole. 
13 What  is perhaps  ironic  about  these  three  arguments  is that  they  were  indeed  instrumental 
in attaining  the  adoption  of the  minimum  wage  in the  first  place.  Therefore,  there  would  be 
ample  historical  precedent  to return  to these  arguments  as foundations  for  a new  policy  that 
would  establish  an independent  mechanism  for  automatically  adjusting  the  minimum  wage  on  a 
regular  basis. 
Historical  Precedent 
During  the  early  part  of the  century,  many  economists,  though  mindful  of the  standard 
theoretical  construct  that  a minimum  wage  might  lead  to lower  employment,  often  advocated  a 
legal  minimum  wage  on  the  grounds  that  it would  lead  to greater  productivity.  They  essentially 
argued  the  value  of an efficiency  wage  on  the  premise  that  those  who  were  paid  more  would  be 
able  to maintain  themselves  better  and  thus  produce  more.  Webb,  in particular,  argued  that  a 
wage  floor  would  be beneficial  to employees  and  employers  alike.  Employers  would  most 
appreciate  the  security  it would  provide  them  against  being  undercut  by  dishonest  or disloyal 
competition.  There  was  in fact  a distinction  to be drawn  between  the  fixing  and  enforcing  of  a 
minimum  wage  and  the  fixing  and  enforcement  of a wage.  From  the  standpoint  of  economic 
theory,  Webb  reasoned  that  there  was  nothing  in a legal  minimum  wage  that  could  be  calculated 
to diminish  productivity.  On the  contrary,  it would  actually  increase  productivity.  Universal 
enforcement  of  a minimum  wage  would  in no  way  eliminate  competition  for  employment;  rather 
it would  transfer  pressure  from  one  element  in the  bargain  to the  other.  Unregulated  employment 
leads  employers  to  select  the  cheapest  labor,  but  not  necessarily  the  best  labor.  Preference  might 
instead  be given  the  incompetent,  the  weak  and  those  with just  plain  bad  character.  As  a result  of 
14 this,  productivity  will  naturally  tend  to be low,  and  ultimately  so too  will  efficiency.  The 
aggregate  efficiency  of the  nation’s  industry  would  be promoted  as the  best  available  candidates 
are hired.  A legal  minimum  wage,  then,  would  positively  increase  the  productivity  of the  nation’s 
industry  by  ensuring  that  those  who  are left  unemployed  would  be the  least  productive  members 
of the  workforce.  Not  only  would  employers  be forced  to look  for the  best  workers  so as to 
increase  their  overall  productivity,  employees  would  be  forced  to develop  their  skills  so that  they 
could  be counted  among  the  better  class  of workers  (Webb,  1912). 
This  position  wasn’t  just  consigned  to the  other  side  of the  Atlantic,  for  on  this  side  John 
Bates  Clark  was  already  arguing  that  in the  absence  of a wage,  employers  would  essentially 
choose  from  the  ranks  of the  most  necessitous  men  and  women.  Trade  unions  would,  of course, 
go  a long  way  toward  removing  this  evil,  but  in the  absence  of unions,  the  law  might  remove  it. 
As  Clark  observed: 
Mere  need  and  helplessness  give  citizens  a certain  valid  claim  on  the  state,  even  though  it 
has  done  nothing  to cause  their  troubles.  Privation  that  is traceable  to  social  defects 
makes  a more  cogent  claim.  This,  in fact,  is the  basis  of  the  demand  for minimum  wage 
laws,  since  the  ill-paid  workers  are regarded  as victims  of  social  arrangements  (Clark, 
1913,  p. 294). 
Although  many  in the  American  business  community  were  opposed  to the  imposition  of  a 
legal  minimum  wage  on the  grounds  that  it would  represent  some  type  of abridgement  of their 
property  rights  (McSweeney,  1913;  Brown,  19 17), there  were  those  very  supportive  of  it again 
because  it would  lead  to greater  overall  productivity.  One  of the  most  notable  supporters  of  it in 
the  business  community  was  Edward  Filene.  In the  pages  of the American  Economic  Review, 
Filene  wrote  that  one  way  of  increasing  efficiency  was  for  employers  to pay  wages  that  would 
command  higher  quality  employees.  This  would  be more  efficient  because  employers  would  not 
15 have  to  spend  as much  time  providing  direction  and  correcting  the  errors  of those  who  were 
inefficient.  But  with  regards  to the  traditional  argument  that  minimum  wages  would  simply  drive 
certain  businesses  out  of the  state,  Filene  thought  that  it was just  as well  to let them  go.  From  his 
standpoint,  any  business  that  could  not  pay  a living  wage  -  a wage  sufficient  to sustain 
profitable  consumers  was  not  good  for the  state  and  therefore  had  no  right  to be in it. Low  wages 
simply  result  in employers  having  cheap  standards  and  that  these  low  standards  produced 
inefficient  employees.  Employers  would  not  be able  to get  effective  organization  out  of those 
who  were  unintelligent,  and  they  could  not  be  intelligent  if they  did  not  have  enough  to  live  on 
properly. 
Therefore,  if the  state  fixes  a minimum  wage  it helps  the  employer  as well  as the 
employee.  It enables  the  employer  to be  sure  that  he will  not  be undersold  at the  expense  of other 
employers.  It prevents  employers  from  having  a body  of employees  who,  because  they  are poorly 
paid,  are able  to be  consumers  of his business.  Employers  who  do  pay  more  are in turn  forced  to 
take  an interest  in their  employees  -  to  educate  them  to a level  that  will  make  them  worth  the 
wage.  And  minimum  wage  laws  force  employers  to be interested  in community  affairs.  But  even 
if the  wage  should  result  in a certain  number  of people  losing  their  jobs,  it is still  to the  good  of 
the  larger  community  because  it would  force  the  state  to do  its job  of providing  education  and 
training  workers.  To  this  extent,  the  minimum  wage  would  serve  to enhance  public  efficiency 
(Filene,  1923).  They  further  argued  that  those  who  paid  less  than  what  was  necessary  to  support 
their  labor,  were  essentially  parasites  on the  community,  as the  difference  would  ultimately  have 
to come  from  some  place  (Leher,  1987, p.77).  Or as H. LaRue  Brown  noted,  nothing  would  make 
for  greater  inefficiency  than  hunger,  worry,  discontent.  Those  employees  able  to maintain 
16 themselves  would  surely  be better  workers.  Minimum  wages,  then,  had  to be  seen  as part  of  a 
great  social  advance  (H. Brown,  19 13). And  indeed,  only  a few  years  after  the  initial  minimum 
wage  laws  took  effect,  Arthur  Holcombe  of Harvard  observed  that  the  minimum  wage  neither  led 
to the  replacement  of women  by men  nor  did  it result  in any  decrease  in efficiency.  On  the 
contrary,  the  experience  suggested  that  the  benefits  originally  anticipated  by  the  early  advocates 
were  indeed  being  secured  (Holcombe,  19 17). 
The  initial  minimum  wage  legislation  during  the  early  part  of the  century  had  been 
promulgated  by  the  states  and  only  applied  to women.  Men,  it was  believed,  did  not  need  such 
protection,  as it was  believed  that  they  sought  to join  labor  unions.  Women,  however,  were  not 
allowed  to join  the  unions.  And  while  unions  originally  favored  minimum  wage  legislation  for 
women,  they  opposed  it for men  because  they  wanted  to encourage  voluntary  association.  But 
progressives  who  supported  the  minimum  wage  for women  also  viewed  themselves  as supporters 
of what  came  to be known  as a family  wage.  This  was  the  notion  that  men  should  be paid  a wage 
sufficient  to  support  a family  and  that  a women’s  place  was  in the  home  taking  care  of her 
family.  Hence  a minimum  wage  for women  would  naturally  lead  to a greater  preference  for  men 
in hiring,  thereby  shoring  up  the  integrity  of the  family. 
But  by  the  time  the  Fair  Labor  Standards  Act  took  effect  in  1938,  which  applied  to both, 
there  were  larger  economic  issues  to consider.  As  much  as the  various  states  with  their  own 
minimum  wage  laws  during  the  Progressive  era may  have  paved  the  way  for the  federal  law  in 
1938,  the  new  law  was  very  much  a product  of the  Great  Depression.  As  a matter  of  simple 
economics,  the  depression  generated  two  key  problems:  high  unemployment  and  depressed 
wages  and  prices.  The  goal  of policy,  then,  was  to  1) generate  jobs  and  2) inflate  prices.  Public 
17 works  would  serve  to generate  jobs  in the  name  of putting  purchasing  power  into  the  hands  of 
potential  consumers.  As  they  demanded  goods  and  services,  prices  would  eventually  begin  to 
rise.  Wages  could  also  be inflated  by  legally  sanctioning  collective  bargaining  as one  means  of 
achieving  higher  wages.  But  they  could  also  be  inflated  by  creating  a mandatory  wage  floor. 
Although  scholars  have  debated  whether  or not  the  New  Deal  as a whole  was  revolutionary,  the 
thinking  at the  time  was  actually  quite  conservative  -  to get  business  back  on  its feet.  In  as 
much  as these  steps  were  radical  -  as measured  against  laissez-faire  standards  -  they  were 
conservative  in the  larger  Burkean  tradition  of striving  to conserve  a venerated  tradition: 
capitalism.  And  as much  as the  minimum  wage  too  may  have  been  viewed  as part  of this  larger 
effort  to  get  business  back  on track,  there  were  still  plenty  who  opposed  it, and  for many  of the 
same  reasons  it was  always  opposed. 
The  objective  was  to establish  a minimum  set of standards  that  would  ensure  that 
producers  in one  region  of the  country  would  not  have  unfair  competitive  advantage  over 
producers  in another  because  they  were  either  paying  substandard  wages  or working  their 
employees  excessively  long  hours.  There  were,  however,  a number  of exemptions  from  the  law. 
For  the  most  part,  the  only  workers  covered  by the  law  were  those  engaged  in goods  production 
and  interstate  commerce.  Excluded  from  coverage  were  those  engaged  in local  retail  sales, 
intrastate  commerce,  transportation,  and  agriculture.  Of course,  executive,  administrative  and 
professional  workers  were  excluded,  as it was  assumed  that  1) their  wages  were  considerably 
more  than  the  minimum  and  2) the  nature  of their  work  was  such  that  a time  clock  could  not  be 
imposed.  What  is important  to note  is that  many  of those  whom  we  today  associate  with  the 
lower  end,  if not  the  lowest  end,  of the  wage  scale  were  simply  not  covered  by  the provisions  of 
18 the  FLSA.  And  those  for  whom  the  law did  apply,  they  were  more  likely  to be members  of  a 
trade  union,  in which  case  their  wages  would  be higher  than  the  statutory  minimum  any  way. 
Within  six months  of  its passage,  Elmer  Andrews,  the  Wage  and  Hours  administrator, 
was  proclaiming  it a success  insofar  as it had  successfully  become  a permanent  part  of the  law  of 
the  land.  At the  same  time,  he  was  careful  to note  that  its popularity  perhaps  derived  from  the 
modesty  of the  statute  itself  that  better  enabled  business  to adjust.  Because  of  its limited  scope, 
compliance  was  the  rule;  not  the  exception  (Andrews,  1939).  The  law  did  no  doubt  create  a 
major  precedent  for  federal  involvement  in wage  regulation,  but  the  more  important 
accomplishments  were  yet  to come  in the  subsequent  amendments.  Still,  one  wonders,  given  its 
limited  scope,  just  what  the  federal  government  was  attempting  to  accomplish.  Although  it was 
likely  to be the  case  that  northern  parts  of the  U.S.  where  wage  rates  were  already  higher  than  the 
established  statutory  minimum  would  not  be affected  that  much,  those  regions  where  rates  were 
considerably  lower  -  particularly  in the  South  -  were.  The  minimum  wage  would  achieve 
some  measure  of fairness  by  eliminating  regional  disparities.  States  with  lower  wage  rates  would 
effectively  lose  some  of their  comparative  competitive  advantage  by  having  to pay  a higher  wage 
rate.  That  some  states  enjoyed  this  competitive  advantage  was  viewed  to be unfair.  At  the  same 
time  many  of the  exemptions  appeared  to apply  to workers  who  were  more  likely  to be 
congregated  in the  South  and  the  West.  In the  end,  then,  consensus  was  built  on  the  basis  of  a law 
that  would  be extremely  limited  in both  its impact  and  scope.  Most  of the  opposition  would 
effectively  be muted  by  limiting  the  scope  to areas  and  people  that  would  not  immediately  affect 
them  politically. 
19 The  circumstances  under  which  the  wage  was passed  is ultimately  what  is responsible  for 
the  type  of  ambivalence  the  nation  has  had  towards  the  minimum  wage  since.  As  a matter  of 
course,  Congress  has  not  been  able  to  introduce  a scheme  of  indexation  for  fear  that  it would  lead 
to  inflation.  Indexation  was  first  introduced  during  discussions  of the  1977  amendments  to 
FLSA.  Not  only  was  organized  labor  arguing  for  an immediate  restoration  of the  minimum  wage 
to 60 percent  of average  annual  hourly  earnings,  but  indexation  to  ensure  that  it would  always 
remain  at 60 percent.  Not  only  was  it believed  that  this  would  assist  the  working  poor,  but  it 
would  be beneficial  to business  insofar  as it would  offer  them  stability  and  a regular  pattern  of 
cost  increases  (Levitan  & Belous,  1979).  And  yet,  even  in those  cases  where  indexation  has  even 
been  suggested,  it has  been  abandoned  just  to obtain  the  support  for  an increase  itself.  And  yet,  as 
recent  history  has  shown,  this  critical  failure  in policy  has  resulted  in a wage  which  has  failed  to 
keep  up  with  the  rate  of  inflation  -  and  perhaps  a situation  where  the  only  group  willing  to  work 
for  the  minimum  wage  is specifically  the  teen  labor  market. 
In  a study  for the  Economic  Policy  Institute,  William  Spriggs  and  Bruce  Klein  found  that 
when  the  minimum  wage  rises,  the  starting  wages  of nearly  3/5 of those  in starting  positions  also 
rise,  regardless  of whether  their  jobs  actually  pay  minimum  wages  or not.  When  the  minimum 
wage  remains  constant-  thus  falling  in real  terms  -  their  wages  are held  down.  Because  the 
minimum  wage  was  held  constant  from  198 1-l 989,  a full  time  worker  heading  a family  of three 
and  earning  the  minimum  fell  $2,300  below  the  poverty  line  in  1992.  But  this  worker  would  have 
been  above  the  poverty  line  in  1979.  This  same  worker  in a family  of two  would  have  fallen 
$606  below  the  poverty  line.  And  if this  worker  was  heading  a family  of  four,  s/he  would  have 
fallen  $5,364  below  the  poverty  line.  According  to this  study,  although  minimum  wages  may  be 
20 important  in affecting  employment  levels,  it plays  a significant  role  in determining  the  wages  of 
America’s  overall  workforce  -  especially  those  with  only  a high  school  education  and  those 
living  in rural  areas.  This  is because  despite  changes  in minimum  wages,  firms  merely  maintain 
their  internal  wage  structures.  That  is, they  view  the  minimum  wage  as a reference  point  for  what 
starting  wages  ought  to be.  Although  some  evidence  might  suggest  that  higher  labor  turnover 
relates  significantly  to increases  in employment  after  minimum  wage  changes,  increases 
generally  do  not  have  a significant  effect  overall  on  employment.  Rather  the  cost  of maintaining 
low  value  for the  minimum  wage  is the  diminished  opportunities  for young  adult  workers  during 
the  1980s  (Spriggs  and  Klein,  1994).  Also  as David  Gordon  has  argued  more  recently, 
conventional  estimates  look  at those  earning  at or below  the  minimum  wage  at a specific  point  in 
time.  And  yet,  a decline  in the  real  value  of the  minimum  wage  affects  a much  wider  segment  of 
the  labor  market.  It also  affects  those  earning  in between  where  the  real  minimum  wage  used  to 
be and  where  it winds  up  at the  end  of the  dip.  Therefore,  an increase  in the  minimum  wage  is 
likely  to  cause  an upward  pressure  on  the  wages  of those  earning  above  the  old  minimum  wage 
and  those  earning  the  new  wage  (Gordon,  1996, p. 215).  If minimum  wages,  as they  suggest,  are 
a cultural  artifact,  the  implication  might  be enormous.  Presumably  that  reference  point  could  be 
altered.  In other  words,  is this  reference  point  really  a function  of where  the  market  clears,  or is it 
because  there  is a broad  consensus  of what  the  wage  is? 
The  more  important  implication,  however,  is the  notion  that  wages  are determined  more 
by structural  factors  than  by  competitive  markets.  Consider  the  following  data. 
21 Table  II Percent  of Hourly  Paid  Workers  Earning  Minimum  Wage 
Year  Both  Sexes  Men  Women 
1979  13.3  7.7  20.2 
1980  15.1  9.6  21.6 
1981  15.1  9.6  21.2 
1982  12.8  8.6  17.3 
1983  12.2  8.4  16.4 
1984  11.0  7.5  14.8 
1985  9.9  6.9  13.2 
1986  8.8  6.9  11.9 
1987  7.9  5.4  10.5 
1988  6.5  4.4  8.6 
1989  5.1  3.5  6.7 
1990  5.1  3.3  7.0 
1991  9.3  6.7  11.8 
1992  7.6  5.7  9.5 
1993  6.6  5.0  8.2 
1994  6.2  4.7  7.8 
Source:  Drawn  from  Table  9, U.S.  Department  of Labor,  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics, 
unpublished  tabulations  from  the  Current  Population  Survey  (CPS) 
Table  III  Percentage  of Minimum  Wage  Earners  by Sex,  Marital  Status  and  Age 
Both  Sexes  Men  Women 
Total,  16 years  and  over  6.2  4.7  7.8 
Never  Married  11.3  9.4  13.7 
16 to 24 years  15.7  13.2  18.5 
25  and  over  years  5.1  4.3  6.2 
25 to  54 years  5.0  4.2  6.2 
Married,  spouse  present  3.3  1.9  4.7 
16 to 24 years  8.5  5.2  11.4 
25  and  over  years  2.9  1.7  4.2 
25 to 54 years  2.7  1.4  4.1 
Other  Marital  Status  5.4  2.9  6.9 
16 to 24 years  13.2  6.1  16.9 
25  and  over  years  5.1  2.8  6.5 
25 to  54 years  4.6  2.6  6.0 
Source:  Drawn  from  Table  7, U.S.  Department  of Labor,  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics, 
unpublished  tabulations  from  the  CPS. 
22 Those  who  point  to the  low  percentage  of those  earning  the  minimum  wage  as evidence  that  the 
wage  as an aid  to the  poor  would  be poorly  targeted,  often  fail to note  that  in  1979  the  percentage 
of the  labor  force  earning  the  minimum  wage  was  more  than  double.  Although  there  is a higher 
percentage  of women  earning  the  minimum  wage  than  men  relatively  speaking,  the  percentage  of 
women  earning  the  minimum  wage  in  1979 was  considerably  higher.  The  gap  between  men  and 
women  narrows  from  12.5 in  1979 to 3.1  in  1994. 
It is true  that  the  highest  percentage  of minimum  wage  workers  are to be  found  among 
the  16-24  age  cohort,  but  there  is still  a considerable  number  of minimum  wage  earners  outside 
that  cohort.  What  appears  to have  gotten  little  notice  is that  this  decline  also  appears  to coincide 
with  a period  when  the  minimum  wage  declined  in value.  If there  is a relationship,  it would  seem 
to have  some  critical  implications.  On  the  one  hand,  it might  be  inferred  that  fewer  people 
earning  the  minimum  wage  is a measure  of progress  in that  fewer  minimum  wage  earners  might 
presuppose  that  these  workers  have  been  successful  in moving  out  of minimum  wage  jobs.  This 
is clearly  an argument  that  supporters  of the  competitive  market  model  are likely  to make.  On  the 
other  hand,  it is perhaps  disturbing  that  this  trend  does  coincide  with  the  declining  value  of the 
minimum  wage.  We  are perhaps  left  to wonder  whether  those  who  were  earning  the  minimum 
wage  previously  didn’t  simply  drop  out  because  the  value  of the  wage  was  simply  inadequate. 
Many  of these  people,  especially  women  with  children,  have  been  able  to receive  greater  income 
through  public  assistance  programs.  If this  is true,  it would  lend  support  to the  notion  that  a 
higher  wage,  or at least  one  that  more  closely  approximates  50 percent  of  average  annual  hourly 
earnings,  will  attract  those  at the  low  end  of wage  scale  into  the  labor  market.  It is the  latter 
argument  that  we  are more  likely  to  see from  those  supporters  of the  monopsony  model. 
23 The  other  issue  to consider,  of which  unfortunately  there  is little  data  on  the  matter,  is just 
how  many  people  would  have  been  attracted  to the  labor  market  were  the  wage  set  at a higher 
level  -  a wage  sufficient  to make  work  viable  for many  who  previously  may  have  found  public 
assistance  to be more  attractive.  Although  there  is little  data  on  this,  the  question  is critical  given 
recent  changes  to the  national  welfare  law.  As  a function  of new  law,  states  will  have  to reduce 
their  welfare  rolls  by  50 percent  by 2002.  Some  of this  will  be done  through  the  creation  of work 
programs  intended  to  assist  some  recipients  in job  search  and  other  in the  development  of  skills 
and  other  work  habits.  But  much  of  it will  be accomplished  by  directing  as many  as possible  into 
the  private  labor  market.  Therefore,  in order  for “work”  to be  a successful  option,  it does  indeed 
need  to pay  (Bane  & Ellwood,  1994) 
Policy 
To  achieve  a liveable  wage  would  require  a drastic  measure  by  Congress.  To  even  bring 
the  wage  into  lines  with  50 percent  of average  annual  hourly  earnings  would  require  an 
immediate  increase  of at least  15 percent.  Herein  lies  the  political  problem  that  has  been  driving 
many  of the  economic  consequences  of  a declining  minimum  wage.  The  larger  the  increase  in the 
minimum  wage,  the  more  of  a shock  it is bound  to be to that  sector  of the  economy  that  hires 
most  minimum  wage  workers.  A mechanism  for increasing  the  wage  in small  increments  on  an 
annual  basis  would  offer  greater  stability.  But  because  of the  immediate  shock  that  would  attend 
to  such  a large  increase,  Congress  is less  likely  to vote  on  an immediate  increase.  The  natural 
consequence  of this  is that  the  value  of the  wage  erodes  even  further.  So by  the  time  Congress 
feels  that  it can  act because  it in fact  must,  it is too  little  and  too  late. 
24 To  have  a wage  that  enables  individuals  to support  a family  above  the  poverty  line 
would  require  some  mechanism  for  automatically  adjusting  the  wage  on  an annual  basis.  The 
obvious  mechanism  for this  would  be to simply  tie the  wage  to the  Consumer  Price  Index  (CPI). 
This  has  the  obvious  benefit  of raising  wages  by whatever  percentage  increase  there  is in the  CPI. 
So  a three  percent  increase  in the  CPI  would  result  in a three  percent  increase  in the  wage.  But 
for  a variety  of reasons,  this  is not  necessarily  the  path  that  Congress  ought  to take.  First  of all, 
studies  have  shown  the  CPI  to overstate  the  rate  of  inflation  (Papadimitriou  & Wray,  1996). 
Although  the  CPI  does  indirectly  reflect  productivity  increases  through  price  increases,  it still  is 
not  known  how  much  of a productivity  increase  there  has  been.  Because  there  hasn’t  been  a 
direct  measure  of productivity  that  is directly  commensurate  with  increase  in wages,  there  may 
be  a tendency  to  view  such  a measure  as having  an inflationary  effect.  Indeed  an increase  in the 
wage  without  a commensurate  increase  in productivity  would  be  inflationary.  And  in fact,  many 
businesses  have  moved  away  from  the  traditional  cost-of-living  adjustment  in favor  of  armual 
bonuses  based  on  productivity. 
Therefore,  a minimum  wage  indexation  mechanism  tied  to productivity  increases  would 
probably  be the  wisest  policy  course  from  both  the  standpoint  of  economic  theory  and  political 
feasibility.  The  problem  with  a productivity  index  is that  productivity  is very  hard  to define,  let 
alone  measure.  Nevertheless,  there  are a couple  of policy  approaches  that  could  be  employed, 
which  would  not  require  getting  mired  in the  labyrinth  of productivity  definition.  The  first  would 
simply  involve  tying  the  minimum  wage  to a certain  percentage  of mean  hourly  earnings  or the 
median  of annual  earnings.  And  indeed,  for much  of the  history  of the  minimum  wage  program, 
the  wage  did  hover  around  50 percent  of average  annual  hourly  earnings.  The  problem  with 
25 means,  however,  is that  they  may  not  be good  measures  of people’s  actual  wages.  Averages,  after 
all,  can  be skewed  by  extremes  at either  end  of the  spectrum.  Therefore,  a better  measure  might 
be to create  an index  on  the  basis  of median  wages,  Were  the  wage  to be  set  at that  level  based  on 
the  median  for  1996  of  $12.25,  the  minimum  wage  would  be $6.13  as opposed  to the  $5.15  it is 
currently.  Then  whatever  percentage  the  average  annual  wage  increases  by,  the  minimum  wage 
increases  by  the  same  percentage.  Table  IV  shows  what  the  relationship  between  the  minimum 
wage  and  the  median  hourly  wage  would  have  been  had  it been  tied  to a percentage  of  average 
annual  hourly  earnings. 
Table  IV  Median  Annual  Wage  Index  (assumes  minimum  wage  at 50%) 
Year  Med.  Wage  % increase  indexed  wage  actual  minimum  difference  % diff 
1983  7.73  3.87  3.35  (0.33)  9.9 
1984  8.15  5.4  4.08  3.35  (0.72)  21.5 
1985  8.58  5.3  4.30  3.35  (0.95)  28.4 
1986  8.95  4.3  4.48  3.35  (1.13)  33.7 
1987  9.33  5.0  4.70  3.35  (1.35)  40.3 
1988  9.63  3.2  4.85  3.35  (1.50)  44.8 
1989  9.98  3.6  5.02  3.35  (1.67)  49.9 
1990  10.38  4.0  5.22  3.80*  (1.42)  37.4 
1991  10.75  3.6  5.41  4.25*  (1.16)  27.3 
1992  11.13  3.5  5.60  4.25  (1.35)  31.8 
1993  11.58  4.0  5.82  4.25  (1.57)  36.9 
1994  11.68  0.9  5.89  4.25  (1.63)  38.4 
1995  11.98  2.6  6.03  4.25  (1.78)  41.9 
1996  12.25  2.3  6.17  4.70”  (1.47)  31.3 
1997**  12.62  3.0  6.36  5.15*  (1.21)  23.5 
*These  are the  years  that  increases  in the  statutory  minimum  wage  took  effect.  The  figures  for 
** 1997  represent  estimates  based  on  a 3.0 percent  increase. 
Source:  Authors  calculations  based  on  data  in unpublished  tables  from  the  U.S.  Department  of 
Labor,  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  for the  years  1983-96. 
On  the  basis  of this  index,  the  minimum  wage  comes  out  to$6.36,  a $1.2 1 more  that  the  current 
statutory  minimum  wage.  And  by  applying  the  increase  to minimum  wage  workers,  everybody 
shares  in the  benefits  of productivity  growth. 
26 The  virtue  of this  approach  over  the  CPI  is the  assumption  that  could  reasonably  be made 
that  whatever  increase  occurred  was  based  on  an increase  in productivity.  The  only  drawback  to 
this  approach  is the  apparently  arbitrary  nature  of establishing  the  wage  rate.  Why,  after  all, 
assume  that  a minimum  wage  worker  is only  worth  50 percent  as opposed  to more?  The 
policymaker  may  not  want  to get  involved  in making  moral  judgements  about  the  intrinsic  worth 
of  individuals.  But  at the  same  time,  there  is historical  precedent  for this  approach  because  in the 
past,  Congress,  when  it would  raise  the  wage,  would  aim  to restore  it to  somewhere  between  50- 
55 percent,  as has  already  been  noted  in Table  I. 
The  second  approach  would  be to  look  at the  median  of the  lowest  wage  workers  in the 
U.S.  and  to regard  them  as being  in effect  low-skilled  workers.  Instead  of dealing  with  the 
different  gradations  of  skills,  we  would  simply  assume  there  are two  kinds  of workers:  skilled 
and  unskilled.  The  average  wage  of the  lowest  skilled  workers  would,  to  a large  extent,  serve  as a 
reference  point,  and  for  all practical  purposes  be the  putative  minimum  wage.  This,  would,  of 
course,  have  implications  for the  statutory  minimum  wage.  Again,  whatever  percentage  increase 
there  was  in the  putative  minimum  wage  would  simply  be  applied  to the  statutory  minimum 
wage.  Again,  it would  be  assumed  that  increases  in the  putative  minimum  wage  are based  on 
productivity  increases,  which  ultimately  means  that  instead  of the  government  deciding  on  the 
rate  of  increase,  the  private  sector  would  be doing  so. The  assumption,  again  is that  the  private 
sector  is better  poised  to make  determinations  of productivity  increases.  This  scenario  can  be 
seen  in Table  V. 
27 Table  V Median  Wages  of the  Lowest  Wage  Sector 
Year  Med.  Wage  % increase  indexed  wage  actual  minimum  difference  % diff 
1983  4.70  3.35 
1984  5.00  6.4  3.56  3.35  (0.21)  6.3 
1985  5.00  -  3.56  3.35  (0.21)  6.3 
1986  5.13  2.6  3.65  3.35  (0.30)  9.0 
1987  5.33  3.9  3.79  3.35  (0.44)  13.1 
1988  5.53  3.8  3.93  3.35  (0.58)  17.3 
1989  5.75  4.0  4.09  3.35  (0.70)  20.9 
1990  6.13  6.6  4.36  3.80”  (0.56)  14.7 
1991  6.40  4.4  4.55  4.25*  (0.30)  7.1 
1992  6.48  1.3  4.61  4.25  (0.36)  8.5 
1993  6.68  3.1  4.78  4.25  (0.53)  12.5 
1994  6.68  -  4.78  4.25  (0.53)  12.5 
1995  6.85  2.5  4.90  4.25  (0.65)  15.3 
1996  7.08  3.4  5.06  4.70*  (0.36)  7.7 
1997**  7.29  3.0  5.21  5.15*  (0.06)  1.2 
*These  are the  years  that  increases  in the  statutory  minimum  wage  took  effect.  The  figures  for 
** 1997  represent  estimates  based  on  a 3 .O percent  increase. 
Source:  Authors  calculations  based  on  data  in unpublished  tables  from  the  U.S.  Department  of 
Labor,  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  for the  years  1983-96. 
Although  the  indexed  wage  does  not  come  out  much  higher  than  it is currently,  and  most  likely  it 
still  does  not  offer  much  assistance  to  low-wage  workers,  it would  still  have  the  virtue  of 
evolving  through  a gradual  and  regular  process,  which  would  remove  the  shock  attendant  to most 
increases  according  to the  procedures  currently  in place.  The  virtue  of the  second  over  the  first  is 
that  most  of those  who  are going  to take  minimum  wage  jobs  are going  to be working  in the 
lowest  wage  sector  of the  economy.  Therefore,  it might  seem  reasonable  to  allow  that  sector  to 
have  a greater  say  in the  rate  of increase,  based  on productivity  levels,  that  could  be  applied  to 
the  statutory  minimum  wage.  Even  though  the  minimum  wage  worker  is not  much  better  off  than 
s/he  would  be under  the  current  statutory  minimum  wage,  this  worker  would  still  see  an  increase 
in his/her  earnings  over  the  next  few  years.  This  would  then  slow  down  the  decline  in the  value 
28 of his  or her  wages  until  the  next  supposed  crisis  that  would  force  Congress  to  finally  take  action, 
which  would  again  be too  little  and  too  late.  This  is by  no  means  immaterial,  for  if the  new 
welfare-to-work  programs  are to succeed  in moving  welfare  recipients  into  the  labor  market  and 
keep  them  there,  these  people  need  to  see tangible  evidence  that  their  wages  will  grow  and  that 
“work”  can  ultimately  pay. 
This,  then,  leads  to yet  another  consideration.  That  is to ask just  how  much  one  would 
need  to cover  basic  living  expenses.  Doug  Henwood,  for  instance,  has  estimated  that  in  1991 
dollars  a household  would  need  to  $29,614  to cover  yearly  expenses  on  the  assumption  of  an 
average  annual  wage  of  $10.33.  At this  rate,  this  household  would  have  to work  55 hours  a week. 
If this  is a family  of  four,  it is only  at twice  the  poverty  level.  An  estimated  wage  on  the  basis  of 
the  median  for the  lowest  wage  sector  would  still  leave  one  below  the  poverty  level,  even 
working  at 55 hours  a week.  The  other  would  not  succeed  in lifting  a household  above  the 
poverty  level  at all. 
Although  it would  be quite  a jump  to raise  the  minimum  wage  from  its current  $5.15  an 
hour  to the  lowest-  wage  sector  median  of $7.29,  the policymaker  might  want  to consider 
establishing  an indexed  wage  initially  set  at that  level.  Were  the  severity  of the  initial  increase  to 
pose  a hardship  for  employers,  perhaps  short-term  subsidies  could  be  offered  to help  defray  the 
initial  costs.  These  subsidies  could  be paid  for by  eliminating  the  EITC,  because  a minimum 
wage  at $7.29  an hour  would  most  likely  exceed  the  combined  value  of the  current  minimum 
wage  and  the  EITC  combined.  And  yet,  the  greater  loyalty  that  higher  wages  might  engender 
among  employees  might  be  immeasurable,  as it would  presumably  lead  to higher  productivity. 
29 Conclusion 
Regardless,  of which  approach  is taken,  the  effect  would  be to create  a public-private 
partnership  type  of relationship  whereby  government  implements  a new  wage  rate  based  on  what 
is happening  in the  private  sector  of the  economy.  Instead  of the  decision  being  made  by  a 
government  bureaucrat,  the  decision  would  effectively  be a grass  roots  decision  on  the  basis  of  a 
consensus  that  was  arrived  at through  the  collectivity  of private  decisions.  Critics  of  indexation 
schemes  often  claim  that  such  measures  would  be  inflationary.  And  yet,  because  the  statutory 
minimum  wage  is so far below  the  putative  minimum  wage  of the  lowest-wage  sector,  it is hard 
to see  how  the  minimum  wage  increasing  at the  same  rates  as the  others  could  exert  much 
inflationary  pressure.  On the  contrary,  annual  increases  in the  wage  would  actually  reduce  much 
of the  shock  that  many  employers  of minimum  wage  workers  must  experience  each  time 
Congress  actually  does  implement  a new  minimum  wage.  When  Congress  has  had  to  act,  it has 
at times  had  to  increase  the  wage  by  as much  as 25 percent  just  to bring  it within  the  50 percent 
range  of the  average,  which  in most  cases  leaves  it below  that  range  for the  median.  And  even 
during  the  years  when  the  minimum  wage  was  restored  to  a level  that  was  still  below  50 percent, 
increases  in their  first  phases  were  still  over  11 percent.  Such  increases  are considerably  greater 
than  whatever  increases  would  be mandated  through  an indexation  mechanism.  Would  this  not 
have  a greater  impact  on  a firm’s  cost  structure  than  gradual  increases?  Of course,  were  the 
minimum  wage  worker  to be  fortunate  enough  to obtain  as much  as an  11 percent  increase,  it 
would  be  a function  of higher  productivity  levels  as opposed  to  a form  of  largess  that  rewards 
inefficiency.  Also  because  the  wages  of those  at the  bottom  would  be rising  along  with 
everybody  else’s,  the  disparity  between  the  top  and  the  bottom  would  not  be  as great. 
30 Ultimately  the  whole  question  of  indexation  requires  us to revisit  the  economic  theory 
which  holds  that  increases  in the  minimum  wage  leads  to  lower  employment.  Is lower 
employment  a function  of the  increase  per  se?  Or is it a function  of the  size  of the  increase?  If the 
great  concern  of most  minimum  wage  employers  is the  wage  rates  of those  earning  around  the 
minimum  wage,  gradual  increases  would  not  have  as great  an impact  as larger  increases. 
Moreover,  automatic  indexation  would  remove  the  issue  from  politics  and  ensure  that  those  at 
the  low  end  of the  wage  scale  can  continue  to earn  a wage  that  keeps  up.  This  might  also  serve  to 
reduce  the  level  of turnover  in minimum  wage  jobs.  In as much  as this  might  reduce  turnover, 
employers  would  have  greater  incentive  to  invest  in on-the-job  training,  which  in turn  will  only 
lead  to greater  productivity. 
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